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CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
The undersigned counsel for petitioners hereby certifies 
that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is a petition for rehearing. This matter originally 
came before the Court on a petition for review of a final decision 
made by the Utah State Tax Conunission (the "Conunission") with 
respect to the petitioners', James and Beverly O'Rourke's (the 
"O'Rourkes") residency status for Utah State income tax purposes 
during the audit periods 1983 through 1988. The Conunission 
determined that the 0' Rourkes failed to file Utah Income Tax 
Returns for the years 1983 through 1988 and sent notices of 
estimated income tax returns assessing unpaid Utah income taxes, 
penalties and interest to the O'Rourkes totalling $24,300.89. 
The O'Rourkes filed a petition for redetermination and 
notice in letter form, which the Conunission answered on or about 
February 5, 1990. A formal hearing was held on the matter on 
January 14, 1991, before Conunission Hearing Officer Paul Iwasaki. 
At the hearing, the sole issue was whether the 0' Rourkes were 
residents of Utah for income tax purposes under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-20-103 (1) (j) (i). 
On April 2, 1991, the Conunission issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision finding that, for all 
periods in question, the 0' Rourkes were residents of Utah for 
income tax purposes. On May 2, 1991, the O'Rourkes filed a notice 
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of petition for review of this court requesting a review of the 
final decision. 
This matter came before the Court on oral arguments on 
December 3, 1991. Stephen R. Cochell argued on the O'Rourkes' 
behalf and Mark E. Wainwright argued for the Commission. This 
Court filed its opinion in the matter (the "Opinion") on February 
13, 1992, holding that the Commission's determination that the 
O'Rourkes established a domicile in Utah and intended to remain in 
Utah for an indefinite time was supported by substantial evidence. 
All capitalized but undefined terms, and all 
abbreviations, used herein shall have the same meanings as those 
ascribed to them in the O'Rourkes' brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Court misapprehended the facts upon which 
the Tax Commission relied in determining that the petitioner, James 
O'Rourke, was domiciled in Utah from 1983 to 1988. 
2. Whether the Court overlooked the facts which proved 
the Petitioner's intent to return to Florida. 
3 . Whether the Court overlooked or misapprehended the 
requirements in Tax Commission Rule 865-9-2I(D) and relevant case 
law in finding that petitioner, James O'Rourke, was domiciled in 
Utah for each of the years 1983 to 1988. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FACTS RELIED UPON BY THIS COURT AND THE 
COMMISSION DO NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
DETERMINATION THAT JAMES O'ROURKE WAS DOMICILED 
IN UTAH FROM 1983 TO 1988. 
In its Opinion, the Court recites several facts which are 
undisputed and which, presumably, were relied upon by the 
Cormnission in determining that James 0' Rourke was domiciled in 
Utah. Among those facts are the following: 
1. The O'Rourkes purchased a home in the Olympus Cove 
area of Salt Lake City; 
2. The O'Rourkes bought a home in Sandy, Utah for James 
O'Rourke's parents; 
3. The O'Rourkes made improvements to both the Olympus 
Cove and the Sandy properties; 
4. The O'Rourkes owned vehicles that were registered in 
Utah; 
5. Beverly O'Rourke had a Utah driver's license and 
registered to vote in Utah; 
6. One of the 0' Rourkes' daughters attended the 
University of Utah and paid resident tuition; and 
7. The O'Rourkes listed Salt Lake City as their residence 
on their federal income tax return. 
Although these facts may support the conclusion that 
Mrs. O'Rourke and her children were domiciled in Utah, they do not 
support the conclusion that Mr. 0' Rourke was domiciled in the 
state. It is well established that the presence of a man's family 
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in a place (and even the existence of substantial contacts with an 
alleged new domicile) do not cause a relinquishment of the family's 
old domicile unless and until the husband has the actual intention 
of making the "new domicile" the family's permanent home. See New 
York Trust Company v. Riley, 16 A.2d 772, 783-84 (Del. 1940). 
The evidence relied upon by the Commission and considered 
by the Court does not bear on Mr. O'Rourke's intent, which is the 
crucial deterrnination in domicile law. Indeed, the Commission's 
own rules clearly provide that, absent the intent to create a new 
domicile, no amount of physical contact with the State of Utah is 
sufficient to subject a person to tax: 
Domicile . . is the place in which a person 
has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself 
and family, not for a mere special or temporary 
purpose, but with the present intention of 
making a permanent home. After domicile has 
been established, two things are necessary to 
create a new domicile: First, an abandonment of 
the old domicile; and second, the intention and 
establishment of a new domicile. 
Tax Commission Rule 865-9-2I(D) (emphasis added). 
This rule espouses the axiomatic domiciliary concept that 
physical presence in a location can never be the basis for the 
creation of a domicile if the requisite intent to create a new 
domicile is not present. See~, Riley, supra.; Arizona Bd. of 
Regents v. Harper, 495 P.2d 453 (Az. 1972); Allen v. Greyhound 
Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Ut. 1978). 
The facts relied upon by the Court are not dispositive of 
James 0' Rourke's intent. The Court and the Commission made 
assessments of the facts viewed as a whole and without reference to 
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when and how they arose; intent was inferred from this entire body 
of facts. 
The facts, when lumped together and viewed years later and 
outside the context in which they occurred, may support the 
inference that the 0' Rourkes were domiciled in Utah during the 
years in question. That inference, however, was clearly rebutted 
in this case. The only direct and express evidence regarding 
intent which was before the Commission and this Court was the sworn 
testimony of Mr. O'Rourke. That testimony, which was unrebutted, 
is that the O'Rourkes never had the intent to remain permanently or 
indefinitely in Utah, and that but for a series of unforeseen 
economic and natural disasters, their contact with the state would 
have been brief. Tr. at 26, 56-57; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 3, 5 
and 6. 
Further, when viewed in the proper context and in light of 
the testimony and other unrebutted evidence on the record, the 
facts relied upon by the Commission clearly do not support a 
finding that the O'Rourkes formed the requisite intent to obtain 
domiciliary status. The Court and the Commission relied on the 
facts that the O'Rourkes moved to Utah, purchased a home here and 
then remained in the state for several years as evidence of the 
O'Rourkes' intent to establish a domicile here. This conclusion, 
however, misapprehends the reasons for the O'Rourkes' purchase of 
their Utah properties and why the O'Rourkes remained in Utah. 
The evidence before the Commission on these issues clearly 
shows that the O'Rourkes bought their home in Olympus Cove 
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primarily for tax purposes and because they believed they could 
sell it very quickly, at a very large profit, and that they could 
use the profit to construct their home on the Eustis property and 
hasten their return to Florida. Tr. at 25-26; Ex. P-17 at Response 
No. 9. 
Similarly, the Commission and this Court misapprehended 
the import and context of the O'Rourkes' improvements to their Utah 
property, Mrs. O'Rourke's Utah driver's license and the O'Rourkes' 
registration of automobiles in the state. The only evidence before 
the Commission and this Court regarding these matters clearly shows 
that the O'Rourkes had no intent of establishing a domicile in Utah 
by taking those actions. Mr. O'Rourke's testimony established that 
the O'Rourkes registered their cars in Utah and that Mrs. O'Rourke 
obtained a Utah license because the O'Rourkes believed that such 
actions were required by law of persons who used Utah roads other 
than on an infrequent basis -- even when the persons using those 
roads had no intent to remain permanently or indefinitely in Utah. 
The O'Rourkes made improvements to their Utah property in the hope 
that those improvements would make the properties more attractive 
to potential buyers, and provide them with a greater return on 
their investment which could be used towards the construction of 
their home in Florida. Tr. at 25-26; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 17. 
Any conclusion that the 0' Rourkes took these actions 
because they considered Utah to be their permanent place of abode 
is unsupported by the evidence in the record. 
6 
Finally, the Commission and this Court apparently 
misunderstood or overlooked the import of the natural and economic 
disasters suffered by the O'Rourkes in concluding that they were 
domiciled in Utah. The O'Rourkes poured massive amounts of money, 
energy and time into their Florida property in order to 
rehabilitate it after the numerous freezes. They also spent 
considerable amounts of time in Florida and maintained significant 
and continuous contacts in that state. See Tr. at 56, 59, 102; Ex. 
P-17 at Response Nos. 18, 19, 24 and 26. These actions make sense 
only if the O'Rourkes intended to return to Florida and intended to 
remain in Utah only for a temporary and special purpose, an action 
which courts have long recognized do not effect a change in 
domicile. See Gates v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 199 F.2d 291 
(lOth Cir. 1952); McDowell v. Friedman Bros. Shoe Company, 115 S.W. 
1028 (Mo. 1909). See also, Tax Commission Rule 865-9-2I(D) 
("Domicile . is the place in which a person has voluntarily 
fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for a mere special 
or temporary purpose, but with the present intention of making a 
permanent home .... ") 
The Commission's and this Court's reliance upon only the 
O'Rourkes' physical contacts in Utah in determining that they were 
domiciled here is inconsistent with the requirements of established 
case law and statute. See Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. 350 
(1875) ("To constitute a new domicile, two things are 
indispensable: First, residence in the new locality; and second, 
the intention to remain there ... ");Grace Drilling Company v. 
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Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (when reviewing 
decisions of administrative bodies, Courts must consider and review 
the whole record and consider not only the evidence supporting the 
administrative body's findings, but also evidence that detracts 
from the weight of the administrative body's evidence). 
II. 
THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED OR OVERLOOKED 
LEGAL AUTHORITY WHICH HOLDS THAT NO 
CHANGE IN DOMICILE TAKES PLACE WHERE A 
PERSON IS PRESENT IN A PLACE FOR A 
TEMPORARY OR SPECIAL PURPOSE, EVEN WHERE 
THAT PERSON IS PRESENT IN THAT LOCATION 
FOR SEVERAL YEARS. 
In the Opinion, this Court affirmed the Commission's 
findings that the 0' Rourkes voluntarily abandoned their domicile in 
Florida as a result of their extended absence from that state and 
because they had substantial contacts in the State of Utah. This 
holding, however, misapprehends or overlooks unrebutted evidence in 
the record that the O'Rourkes came to Utah only for a temporary or 
special purpose. 
Under established domiciliary law, so long as the 
O'Rourkes' intent to return to Florida was based upon the 
occurrence of an event which could be reasonably anticipated to 
occur, that intent cannot support a finding that they abandoned 
their domicile in Florida. See Petition of Oganesoff, 20 F.2d 978 
(D.C.S.D. Cal. 1927) (established domicile not lost by temporary 
residence elsewhere, even for a period of years), People v. 
Chrysler, 26S P. 92 (Colo. 1928) (citing Jain v. Bossen, 62 P. 194 
(Colo. 1900), for the proposition that temporary residence outside 
8 
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from doing so. Accordingly, notwithstanding James 0' Rourke's 
sporadic contacts in Utah and the contacts Mrs. O'Rourke had with 
the State, the Commission's conclusion that the O'Rourkes abandoned 
their domicile in Florida is not supportable in light of the 
0' Rourkes' special and temporary purpose. See Gates, supra 
(intention of taxpayer to return to original horne after he acquired 
sufficient business experience in another location is an intention 
based on an event which may be reasonably anticipated; former 
absence from original domicile not deemed to be abandonment of 
original domicile) ; McDowell, supra (family which gave up residence 
in one city and moved to another for two years with hope that 
warmer climate would benefit daughter's health did not lose 
domicile in first city since, while remaining away, they had the 
intent of returning to the first city when their daughter's health 
improved). 
2I (D) 
III. 
THE COURT OVERLOOKED AND/OR MISAPPREHENDED THE 
REQUIREMENTS IN TAX COMMISSION RULE 865-9-2I(D) 
AND RELEVANT CASE LAW IN FINDING THE PETITIONER 
JAMES O'ROURKE WAS DOMICILED IN UTAH FROM 1983 
TO 1.988. 
Although the Court relied on Tax Commission Rule 865-9-
an authority which Petitioner believes is not only 
relevant, but controlling -- it failed to provide any guidelines 
for determining when a domicile in another state has been abandoned 
and a new domicile in Utah has been established. In its Opinion, 
the Court had the opportunity to articulate an analytical framework 
for determining when a person becomes domiciled in Utah. Instead, 
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Petitioners' intent is rendered irrelevant by such an analysis and 
the approach taken by the Tax Commission and this Court rejects an 
entire body of law related to domicile law and completely writes 
out of existence the "special or temporary purpose" test set forth 
in Tax Commission Rule 865-9-2I(D) and the 183 day rule embodied in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-103. 1 
The Opinion gives the State of Utah the "green light" to 
tax, as residents, persons who have absolutely no intent of 
becoming domiciled in the state or who are here for a period for 
less than the 183 days set forth in §59-10-103, as long as that 
person has some minimal physical contacts with the state to which 
the Commission can point. As a result, taxpayers could conceivably 
be subjected to taxation by two states -- a state other than Utah 
based on the person's intent to be domiciled therein, and Utah 
based on the person's contacts within the state. 
The Tax Commission and this Court utilized an ad hoc 
approach to resolve the question of domicile that flies in the face 
of the Utah statute, Commission Rules and relevant case law. It is 
respectfully submitted that the law requires an analysis of the 
taxpayer's intent. Such an analysis was not accomplished by the 
result oriented approach taken by the Commission and implicitly 
adopted by the Court. 
1This section provided that a "resident individual" is (i) "an 
individual who is domiciled in this state for any period of time 
during the taxable year, but only for the duration of such period; 
or (ii) an individual who is not domiciled in this state but 
maintains a permanent place of abode in this state and spends in 
the aggregate 183 or more days of the taxable year in this state." 
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CONCLUSION 
The 0' Rourkes came to Utah for a temporary purpose, 
intending ar relevant time;:; r.o retuc; 1- -~ ,, :;r:.~a .. A er, 
made _; t :...mpossible for them :~.) ret:.ur:-1 as )rigina::_~cy ::.r:tended. The 
Commission 'F1 d t-his r·' mrt misapprehended facts .:md 'caw 
Utah. 
tct.l..L 1 • < .o llldl T: dua - :-: ~, its analysls of James 0' Rourke and Bever 
0'R.ouLKe; 3nd 1 c~J :-:LL~.1ng to ana.lyze this case ,lc~·"~·rL;,i_ .. z1.n:::r a . .A 
: 11 e f f e :: t . r:_ 11. ::~ : ;iJ.on 
person and each tax year at issue. 
The Opinion gives no consideration to the facts in their 
proper context and as they arose over a period of years and 
provides little or no guidance to the Commission, attorneys or tax 
payers regarding an analytical framework for determining residency 
status for tax purposes where unrebutted testimony regarding intent 
is at odds with other indicia of domicile or where a taxpayer is 
present in the state for a temporary or special purpose. 
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Accordingly, the Court should grant the 0' Rourkes Petition for 
Rehearing. 
DATED this 27th day of February, 1992. 
& LETA 
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rneys for Petitioners 
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Mark E. Wa1nwr1gnc, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah ~411:. 
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